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Abstract 
We establish five facts about the informal economy in developing countries.  First, it is 
huge, reaching about half of the total in the poorest countries.   Second, it has extremely low 
productivity compared to the formal economy: informal firms are typically small, inefficient, 
and run by poorly educated entrepreneurs.   Third, although avoidance of taxes and regulations 
is an important reason for informality, the productivity of informal firms is too low for them to 
thrive in the formal sector.   Lowering registration costs neither brings many informal firms into 
the formal sector, nor unleashes economic growth.  Fourth, the informal economy is largely 
disconnected from the formal economy.   Informal firms rarely transition to formality, and 
continue their existence, often for years or even decades, without much growth or 
improvement.   Fifth, as countries grow and develop, the informal economy eventually shrinks, 
and the formal economy comes to dominate economic life.   These five facts are most 
consistent with dual models of informality and economic development.  
 
 
Rafael La Porta is Noble Foundation Professor of Finance,  Tuck School  of Business at Dartmouth, 
Hanover, New Hampshire. Andrei Shleifer is Professor of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.  Their email addresses are rafael.laporta@tuck.dartmouth.edu  and  
ashleifer@harvard.edu.     In developing countries, informal firms account for up to half of economic activity.   They 
provide livelihood for billions of people.   Yet their role in economic development remains controversial.  
   Some, like Hernando De Soto (1989, 2000), see informal firms as an untapped reservoir of 
entrepreneurial energy, held back by government regulations.   In this view, unleashing this energy by 
reducing entry regulations or improving property rights would fuel growth and development.  Others, 
like Levy (2008), take a more cynical view, stressing the advantages enjoyed by informal firms and 
workers from avoiding taxes and regulations.  A report from the McKinsey Global Institute describes 
informal firms as parasites competing unfairly with law-abiding formal firms (Farrell 2004).  In this view, 
informality should be suppressed, not unleashed.    Still others follow the development tradition of 
Lewis (1954), Harris-Todaro (1970) and more recently Rauch (1991) and see informality as a byproduct 
of poverty.   From this  dual perspective,  formal and informal firms are fundamentally different.   
Productive formal entrepreneurs pay taxes and bear the cost of government regulation to reach new 
customers, raise capital, and access public goods.  These entrepreneurs are often educated, and find it 
more profitable to run bigger formal firms, rather than the smaller informal ones.  In contrast, informal 
entrepreneurs are typically uneducated and unproductive, and they run small businesses producing low-
quality products for low-income customers using little capital and adding little value.  Informal firms do 
not threaten formal firms, and the increase in firm value that the informal entrepreneurs or managers 
could realize by operating formally is too small to offset the additional costs from taxes and regulations.  
In this dual  view,  development comes  from  formal firms, and their expansion as the economy 
modernizes eventually dooms the informal economy.   
  In this paper, we assess these perspectives.   To begin, we establish five critical facts about the 
informal economy.  First, it is huge, especially in developing countries.   Second, it has extremely low 
productivity compared to the formal economy: informal firms are typically small, inefficient, and run by 
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 poorly educated entrepreneurs.   Third, although avoidance of taxes and regulations is an important 
reason for informality, the productivity of informal firms is too low for them to thrive in the formal 
sector.   Lowering registration costs neither brings many informal firms into the formal sector, nor 
unleashes economic growth.  Fourth, the informal economy is largely disconnected from the formal 
economy.   Informal firms rarely transition to formality, and continue their existence, often for years or 
even  decades, without much growth or improvement.   Fifth, as countries grow and develop, the 
informal economy eventually shrinks, and the formal economy comes to dominate economic life.   
  We argue that the evidence is most consistent with dual models of informality.   We first review 
these models, and stress the supply and demand factors that keep informal and formal economies 
separate.  We then address the critical question of how the informal economy shrinks.   In dual models, 
economic growth comes from the formal sector: that is, from firms run by educated entrepreneurs and 
exhibiting much higher levels of productivity.  The expansion of the formal sector leads to the decline of 
the informal sector in relative and eventually absolute terms, although informal employment can remain 
high for a long time, especially when labor force growth is high.  A few informal firms convert to 
formality,  but  more generally  they  disappear because they cannot compete with the much more 
productive formal firms.   Our evidence is not particularly supportive of either De Soto’s romantic view 
of informality as pent-up source of potential, nor of the McKinsey view that informality is a parasitic 
organizational form that hinders economic growth.  The dual view of informality seems most consistent 
with the data.  
 
Five Facts about Informality 
The Informal Economy is Huge           
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   Measuring the informal economy is inherently difficult.   Much  of informality is in farming, 
including both subsistence agriculture and informal sales of marketable crops.  A large part, at least in 
terms of employment, also comes from self-employed sellers and peddlers living at near-subsistence 
levels (Banerjee and Duflo 2011).  Yet even if we look at the more substantial businesses that employ 
workers, such as repair shops, furniture or metal-working factories, or transport firms, many forms of 
informality  are apparent.   At one extreme, some  firms literally do not exist in the eyes  of the 
authorities: they do not register or comply with regulations, they make sales and pay for inputs including 
labor in cash, they do not have bank accounts, they do not pay taxes.   At another extreme, as occurred 
in transition economies (Johnson, Kauffman, and Shleifer 1997), registered firms hide some of their sales 
from  authorities to reduce  profit  taxes, but still higher formal employees and comply with many 
regulations.   And there is everything in between, such as firms that obtain operating permits but do not 
pay social security taxes.  
With these ambiguities in mind, several methods have been used to assess the size of the 
informal economy: surveys of experts about their countries, such as those conducted by the Global 
Competitiveness Report; surveys of entrepreneurs about their own activities, like those conducted by 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys; census counts of people reporting that they are self-employed, 
which is typically a good proxy  for  informality;  and even measures inferred aggregate electricity 
consumption (on the plausible assumption that informal firms must also use electricity).   
Table 1 presents various measures of the size of the informal sector, with 185 countries grouped 
by the quartile of per capita income.   Fortunately, the very different measures of informality all paint a 
very consistent picture.   Depending on the indicator, the informal sector accounts for 30-40 percent of 
total economic activity in the poorest countries, and a higher share of employment.   This falls to 
something closer to 15 or 20 percent in the richest quartile countries.  The last column of Table 1 offers 
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 another perspective: the poorest countries average about 3 registered firms per 1,000 people; in the 
richest quartile countries, this number rises to 42 per 1,000 people.  Especially in the poor countries, the 
informal sector in huge, accounting for a giant share of output and employment.   
 
Informal Firms are Small, Unproductive, and Stagnant 
  For two decades, the World Bank Enterprise Surveys surveyed entrepreneurs and managers in 
both  formal and informal firms, collecting data on their sales and inputs, employee and manager 
education, as well as a variety of assessments of the institutional environment.   These data provide 
considerable evidence on the determinants of productivity of firms in developing countries, including 
their management.   World Bank surveys deal with actual businesses such as furniture producers or shoe 
factories; they do not cover the proverbial sellers of flowers and vegetables, who are also informal but 
have even lower productivity.   
  La Porta and Shleifer (2008) conduct an extensive analysis of size and productivity of formal and 
informal firms using data from poor countries where World Bank surveyed both formal and informal 
businesses.  Several findings stand out (see Online Appendix for a summary Table).  First, informal firms 
– even the real businesses surveyed by the World Bank – are much smaller than formal firms.  An 
average formal firm employs 126 people, while an average informal firm employs only 4.  Informal firms 
are also much less productive, with productivity calculated as value added (sales net of expenditures on 
raw materials and energy) per employee.   As Figure 1 shows, averaging across all the surveys, informal 
firms add only 20 percent the value per employee of formal firms.  The ratio of value added by informal 
firms to that by formal firms ranges from 1 percent in Congo to 70 percent in Cape Verde.  La Porta and 
Shleifer (2008) present some evidence indicating that these productivity differences reflect reality, not 
just underreporting of sales to interviewers by informal firms. 
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   There are two other ways to see the extreme inefficiency of the informal sector.   First, although 
productivity increases with size within the formal sector (see also Hsieh and Olken 2014), Figure 2 shows 
a sharp productivity difference between informal firms and formal firms of the same size.  Inefficiency of 
the informal sector is not just the matter of small size.  Second, La Porta and Shleifer (2008) also find 
that, averaging across countries, wages in informal firms are roughly one-half of those in small formal 
firms, and less than one-third of those in large formal firms, another indication of low productivity.      
Many informal entrepreneurs would gladly close their businesses to work as employees in the formal 
sector if offered the chance, even if wages in the formal sector are taxed while income in the informal 
sector is not.  Few of them have this opportunity.  
  The low value added per employee in the informal sector reflects the extremely low quality of 
products produced by informal firms.   Although quality is difficult to measure, our visits to furniture and 
metal-working factories in Kenya and Madagascar revealed extreme crudeness of the products being 
made, usually with fairly basic tools, even when the raw material (as in the case of furniture) was 
hardwood.  Informal factories appear to sell extremely low quality goods for low prices to low income 
customers.  Informal entrepreneurs in Africa fear formal competition; they repeatedly expressed their 
fear of competition from Chinese imports.  They are far from threatening to formal firms.      
  La Porta and Shleifer (2008) explore the sources of productivity differences between formal and 
informal firms.  One interesting finding is that differences in the human capital of workers are small, at 
least as measured by education.  The data on formal and informal firms contains no direct measures of 
capital, although formal firms are much more likely to have their own electricity generators.   One of the 
most striking differences between formal and informal firms is in the human capital of their managers.  
Figure 3 presents World Bank survey data on the fraction of informal and formal firms run by college-
educated managers.  Consistent with the dual view, only 7 percent of the managers of informal firms 
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 have a college degree, while this number is 76 percent for the formal firms.  In production function 
estimates, managerial human capital emerges as a quantitatively  large and statistically significant 
determinant of productivity.   
Gennaioli et al (2013) report closely related findings for formal firms around the world.   They 
document enormous productivity gaps between firms run by educated versus uneducated managers 
and entrepreneurs.   Production function estimates imply nearly 30 percent returns per extra year of 
education of managers, even though estimated returns to an additional year of worker education are in 
the standard range of 6-7 percent.  The message that emerges consistently from this work is that 
informal firms are hugely unproductive, and a principal reason is the low level of human capital of the 
people who run them.   
  The low productivity of informal firms is reflected in their growth rates as well.   La Porta and 
Shleifer (2008) report sharply lower employment growth rates for informal than for formal firms (5 
percent  vs. 10 percent per year).  Indeed, an average informal firm in World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
had been around for nearly a decade; and has continued its existence with only modest growth even 
during a period of rapid growth of formal firms.  In a similar vein, de Mel et al. (2008) find that roughly 
70 percent of own-account workers in Sri Lanka have backgrounds, abilities, and attitudes more similar 
to those of wage workers than those of owners of firms and that they rarely expand by adding paid 
employees (see also Ardagna and Lusardi  2008).  These findings line up with the evidence from the US 
economy: most US small businesses have little desire to grow big or to innovate in any observable way 
(Hurst and Pugsley 2011).  
 
Regulation is Not What Keeps Informal Firms down 
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   Why don’t informal firms become formal?  De Soto (1989) has famously argued that informal 
firms would like to become formal, but are held back by corruption and government regulation.   World 
Bank Enterprise Surveys of informal entrepreneurs allow a direct assessment of this view.  Table 2 
compares perceived obstacles to doing business reported by informal and formal entrepreneurs.   By far 
the greatest perceived obstacle by both types of firms is lack of access to finance, although informal 
firms perceive this as a much greater problem.  The link between access to finance and registration may 
not be causal, however.  For example, some of the informal firms we visited maintained several months 
of (extremely slow selling) inventory without realizing that it is a form of capital.  Their owners 
simultaneously complained that they did not have financing to buy tools.  Similarly, banks may only lend 
to skilled entrepreneurs or want to see some form of control system (like  accounting books) that 
informal entrepreneurs often lack.  In these ways, lack of human capital might be at the heart of the 
perceived inaccessibility of finance.     
Next to perceived financing problems, government regulations are distant concerns.  Fewer than 
10 percent of either formal or informal firms worry about corruption, business licensing and permits, or 
the legal system.  Lack of access to land is a bigger problem for informal firms, in part because a large 
fraction of them occupy their premises illegally and fear eviction.    It is difficult to read this evidence as 
pointing to the institutional environment as the central obstacle to doing business for informal firms. 
World Bank surveys for a more limited group of 10 countries, mainly in Africa, also offer more 
direct evidence on how respondents from the informal sector perceive the potential benefits from 
registering their firms.
1  Three-quarters of respondents from the informal sector in these surveys 
mention “better access to financing” as a gain, and one-quarter mention “better access to raw 
1 The 10 countries are Angola (2010), Burkina Faso (2009), Botswana (2010), Cameroon (2009), Congo, 
Dem. Rep. (2010), Capo Verde (2009), Mauritius (2009), Mali (2010), and Nepal (2010). For country-by-
country survey responses, see the on-line appendix available with this article at http://e-jep.org. 
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                                                           materials.”  In contrast, “better access to markets” and “fewer bribes” are only mentioned by 14 percent 
of respondents, and potential gains like “better opportunities with formal firms,” “more access to 
government programs,” “better legal foundations on the property,” and “better access to 
infrastructure” are only mentioned by fewer than 10 percent of respondents. This evidence does not 
mean that the institutional environment that informal firms face is good – on the contrary, such firms 
face terrible problems of corruption, police abuse, and crime.   In some countries, informal 
entrepreneurs report that up to 3 percent of their sales are stolen.  Rather, the evidence suggests that 
informal firms do not see that formality will address these problems: they will face corrupt and abusive 
policemen, inspectors, and other officials anyhow.  In the meantime, informal firms report that “other 
firms like their” evade about 75 percent of taxes.  Evading taxes is too attractive to be offset by the 
meager benefits of formality that the informal entrepreneurs would realize.  
 
Informal Firms Rarely Become Formal   
  Informal firms almost never become formal.   La Porta and Shleifer (2008) report that on 
average 91 percent of registered firms started out as registered.    An average surveyed informal firm 
has been in business for nearly a decade, without attempting to become formal.   Also consistent with 
this observation, only 2 percent of informal firms sell their output to large firms (vs. 14 percent of firms 
in the Enterprise Survey).  Informal firms inhabit an economic space of their own, disconnected from the 
formal space.   
  In the last decade or so, processes for registering a business have been simplified in many 
countries around the world, and data on these changes has become available. This push began with De 
Soto’s (1989) emphasis on the costs of registration, which in turn encouraged systematic data collection 
of entry costs around the world by Djankov et al. (2002).  Their approach was in turn adopted by the 
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 World Bank in its Doing Business report, which since 2003 published a variety of measures of business 
regulation, including the regulation of entry, and country rankings.   The Doing Business website reports 
378 policy actions aimed at lowering the cost of registration in 160 countries.  These policy reforms have 
generated a wealth of data on the effect of registration costs on the decision to register and—to a lesser 
degree—on the impact of formality on productivity.   
The most compelling evidence comes from two field experiments.  The first was carried out in 
Belo Horizonte, a city in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais, to test which government actions induce 
informal firms to register.
2  Firms were randomly assigned to a control group or one of four treatment 
groups: the first received information about how to formalize; the second received this information and 
free registration costs along with the use of an accountant for a year; the third group was assigned to 
receive an enforcement visit from a municipal inspector; while the fourth group was assigned to have a 
neighboring firm receive an enforcement visit to see if enforcement has spillovers.  De Andrade et al. 
(2013) report that the likelihood of registering increases by 21 to 27 percentage points if the firm 
receives an actual inspection, but it is unaffected by the other three interventions.  Apparently, most 
informal firms do not formalize unless forced to do so.  
The second field experiment was carried out in Sri Lanka.  De Mel et al. (2013) report that 
information about the registration process and even actual reimbursement of direct costs of registration 
had  no effect on formality.    In contrast, around one-fifth of eligible firms registered when offered 
payments equivalent to one-half to one month of the median firm’s profits, and one-half of eligible firms 
registered when offered payments equivalent to two months of the median firm’s profits.  Firms were 
2  The background of the field experiment is of independent interest.  The process of simplifying the process of 
business registration started in 1996 with the SIMPLES program, which consolidated multiple tax payments and 
contributions into single payment, lowering the tax burden on small firms.  It was followed by the Minas Facil 
program in the state of Minas Gerais in 2005 to reduce number of procedures and time to start a business.  
Despite these efforts, survey data from 2009 reveal that 72 percent of firms in Minas Gerais remained informal. 
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                                                           tracked over the 15, 22, and 31 months after the intervention.  Firms that formalized had higher profits, 
but this effect was largely due to a few firms that experienced substantial growth.
  Jaramillo (2009) 
reports similarly small effects of easier registration from an experiment in Lima, Peru, the city whose 
informal sector De Soto has celebrated.   
The evidence from changes in registration costs is one lens on informality.   Another lens is the 
evidence on the effects of micro-credit, which shows that such credit helps informal entrepreneurs a bit, 
but almost never jump-starts significant growth or transforms them into formal businesses (Karlan and 
Zinman 2011).  Still another lens comes from the emerging image of slums as domains of permanent 
informality rather than hubs of transition between agriculture and the formal sector (Marx et al. 2013).    
These studies suggest that informal firms start out and live out their lives informal, they avoid taxes and 
regulations, they do not trade with the formal sector.  It is difficult to lure them into becoming formal, 
even with subsidies.  Far from being reservoirs of entrepreneurial energy, they are swamps  of 
backwardness.  They allow their owners and employees to survive, but not much more.    
 
As Countries Develop, Informality Becomes Less Important 
  Important as the informal economy is in low-income countries, it becomes much less significant 
in high-income ones.   Table 1 shows that the estimates of the size of the informal economy decline with 
per capita income.  Figure 4 illustrates this point more clearly by showing a strong negative correlation 
between per capita income and the share of economic activity that is informal as measured by the share 
of self-employment in total employment.  Very similar results obtain with the other indicators from 
Table 1.  As an economy develops, informality shrinks.   
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 The Dual View of Informality 
  We have focused on perhaps the most basic facts about the informal economy.   It is extremely 
large in the poorest countries, but it eventually shrinks as countries develop.  It exhibits very low 
productivity.  Informal firms rarely transition to formality, even when encouraged or subsidized to do so; 
rather they carry on without much growth for long periods of time.  They are run by uneducated 
entrepreneurs.   Government policies are definitely a hindrance for informal firms, but they are a 
hindrance to formal firms as well.  Bad government is not the main competitive problem of informal 
firms: their main problem is that they add so little value. 
  The evidence we have presented does not support De Soto’s romantic view of informal firms as 
reservoirs of productive entrepreneurial energy; most of these firms are too inefficient to survive in the 
formal sector, and do not join it even when barriers to entry are eliminated.  Nor is the evidence 
consistent with McKinsey Global Institute’s fear of informal firms; they mostly do not appear to pose 
much of a competitive threat.   The evidence appears most consistent with Lewis’s dual view of 
informality, which sees the formal and informal economies as largely segregated, producing different 
products with different labor, capital and entrepreneurial inputs, and serving different customers.   
  What we call the dual view encompasses several ideas and formal theories.  They all shed light 
on the separation of the formal and informal economies, and the slow movement of activity into the 
formal sector.  To put the issue most directly, if regulation is not to blame, why don’t we see more 
informal entrepreneurs restarting their businesses formally?   For instance, why don’t informal furniture 
producers buy capital and start modern factories?  Why don’t street peddlers open modern stores?  
Alternatively, if formal firms are so efficient, why don’t they capture the whole market straight away, 
and drive out the informal firms?  In all these cases, the transition to formality should be rapid.   
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 Of course, the most obvious answer to all these questions is that formal firms have to pay taxes 
and comply with regulations, so they have a huge cost disadvantage relative to the informal firms.   
Joining the formal sector would raise the costs of informal firms significantly.   The wedge between 
formal and informal labor costs is the major ingredient of all theories of dualism.  But taxes and 
regulations are only part of the story.  Other economics forces – on both the demand and the supply 
side – keep the two sectors separate.   
  The first force goes back to the original theories of dualism, and focuses on demand as a 
constraint on transition to modern production technologies.   Modernizing entrepreneurs need to 
generate sufficient sales to cover the fixed costs of investment.  When the economy is poor, the demand 
for modern products may not suffice to cover these fixed costs.  The problem is particularly severe in 
economies with significant levels of poverty and inequality, where the vast majority of the population 
buys almost no modern manufactured goods.  In such economies, the informal sector delivers low 
quality goods cheaply to people who are themselves informal workers, and who cannot afford the 
output of the higher quality but more expensive formal sector.   In contrast, the formal sector remains 
small and offers high quality goods to a minority of formal workers.   These ideas about demand 
constraints gave rise to the so-called Big Push theory, in which the simultaneous modernization of 
multiple sectors of the economy generates sufficient demand for the products of the modern sector 
from its own employees to actually make the transition to formality profitable (see, e.g., Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny 1989a, b).   Formal workers making quality shoes in formal leather factories buy 
quality chairs made by formal workers employed by formal furniture makers, and vice versa. 
  The demand-based theories of dualism make an important prediction.  Specifically, they suggest 
that population growth may slow down the decline of the informal sector.  To the extent that the formal 
sector is capital intensive, and the informal sector is labor intensive, population growth, particularly if 
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 concentrated among the poor, would keep up both the demand for informal goods, and the supply of 
informal workers.   Even if labor flows toward the formal sector, with high population growth it would 
not flow fast enough to kill informality.  We return to this prediction in the empirical analysis below.        
  In our recent work we have emphasized another input that might slow down the transition to 
formality, namely entrepreneurial and management skills.   As we have already discussed, the evidence 
in World Bank surveys, as well as in other data, shows that managerial inputs are extremely important 
for productivity, and that the managers of informal firms are considerably less educated than the 
managers of formal firms (La Porta and Shleifer 2008, Gennaioli et al. 2013).  The evidence demolishes 
the idea that managers of informal firms can just start larger formal firms and operate them well enough 
to survive in the formal sector: they would not know how.   Shortage of educated entrepreneurs might 
be the most important constraint on transition to formality, much more important than lack of demand. 
  Although the dual view does not see government policies as fundamental to shaping the size of 
the informal sector, they may well play a contributing role to separating the formal and informal 
economies.   As argued by Johnson, Kauffman, and Shleifer (1997), tax avoidance by informal firms 
undermines government tax collection, and therefore the provision of public goods, which makes joining 
the formal sector to access the public goods less attractive.    Levy’s (2008) concern with the fiscal costs 
of informality and distortions arising from differential tax treatment of formal and informal sectors also 
point to the high costs of formality relative to benefits, which keep the informal sector large.         
       The dual view explains how the informal economy shrinks as the formal economy grows.     
Indeed, the decline of informality is the product of replacement of inefficient informal firms by efficient 
formal ones in the process of economic development.   The available evidence both from the cross-
section and from country examples strongly supports this perspective on the decline of informality, and 
indeed suggests that both demand and supply factors play a role in this process.    
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   Figure 5 presents graphically the results of the following regression run at annual frequency 
(with country fixed effects “δ”) for a panel of 68 countries during the period 1990-2012: 
𝗥(self employment) = α + β.ln  (𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑐𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑐𝑡−1)+ γ.ln  (𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑡/𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑡−1)+δi+ε 
 
That is, we regress the change in the percent of labor force in self-employment, a reliable and widely 
available measure of informality, on change in log GDP per capita and change in log labor force.  We run 
this regression in first differences to alleviate the concern that the strong negative correlation between 
self-employment and GDP per capita illustrated by Figure 4 is driven by omitted variables.   
The left panel of Figure 5 shows that faster economic growth is associated with a more rapid 
decline in self-employment.   Doubling GDP per capita is associated with a reduction in self-employment 
of 4.95 percentage points (the mean of self-employment is 26 percent and its standard deviation is 16 
percent).  This estimate says that a low-income country that starts with 50 percent self-employment, 
and then grows consistently at 7 percent per year so that per capita income doubles every 10 years, will 
see its self-employment fall to the high-income  countries’  level of 20 percent after  60  years  –  a 
remarkably slow transition to formality.  The right panel of figure 5 shows that faster labor force growth 
is associated with a slower decline in self-employment, consistent with theoretical prediction.       
Doubling labor force growth is associated with a reduction in self-employment  of 7.38 percentage 
points.  This means that self-employment in the low income country of the previous example would 
converge to the high-income countries’ level in 105 years if its labor force grows consistently at a 2% 
rate while GDP per capita grows at 7%.  In sum, the transition to formality is driven by economic growth, 
but is very slow, and even slower when labor force growth is fast.     
  A comparison of three rapidly growing countries, Korea, Chile, and Peru,  illustrates the 
significance of labor force growth.  For Korea, per capita income rose 2.5-fold between 1990 and 2012. 
During this period, the share of labor force classified as employees rose from 60 to 72 percent, and the 
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 share of self-employed fell from 40 to 28 percent.   Korea’s labor force during this period grew by only 
34 percent in total, so the growth of formal employment share comes largely from an increase in formal 
employees and an actual decline in the number of self-employed.  During the same period, GDP per 
capita rose 2.3-fold in Chile, but its labor force grew almost 70 percent from 5.0 million to 8.5 million.   
We do not see the same kind of reallocation of labor between formal and informal sectors.  Indeed, the 
formal share of employment in Chile has increased only slightly even though, during this period, formal 
employment increased from fewer than 4 million to nearly 6 million persons.    
  These conflicting forces are illustrated most dramatically by the case of Peru, the birthplace of 
De Soto’s (1998) enthusiasm for the potential of the informal sector.  During the period 1990-2012 the 
Peruvian economy has grown  nearly as fast as Korea’s  (2.1-fold) thanks to aggressive liberalization 
policies and the defeat of Maoist guerillas.  Yet the Peruvian labor force grew almost as fast as its per 
capita income, and much of the labor absorption was done by the informal sector.  As a consequence, 
despite the tremendous economic growth, over this period the share of formal employment in Peru has 
declined, and that of informal employment has increased,  even though the level of total  formal 
employment rose from 5 to 8 million people.  Figure 6 uses Peruvian household survey data to graph 
annual GDP per capita, annual income of formal employees, and annual income of the self-employed. 
For the period of 1990-2010   Figure 6 shows rapid economic growth during this period, but also rapid 
increases in formal sector wages.  In a striking contrast, incomes of the self-employed did not rise over 
this period.   Economic growth was driven by the formal sector; the informal sector stagnated.   
  What about the supply side?  Does scarcity of human capital indeed slow down transition to a 
formal economy?  Table 3 presents some evidence on this hypothesis.  It uses sub-national data for 
1,090 regions in 71 countries to examine firm formation and employment composition within countries 
as a function of each region’s level of education.  Table 3  shows that, within countries, the more 
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 educated regions have more formal establishments per capita, more formal employees both relative to 
population and relative to the number of establishments (that is, larger firms), and more formal 
employees employed in large firms relative to population.  Looking across regions within a country (so at 
least national institutions are held constant), transition to a formal economy appears to be driven by 
human capital, consistent with the supply-side theories of dualism we discussed.     
  The bottom line of this evidence seems straightforward.  Economic growth comes from the 
formal sector which absorbs labor in part from the informal sector, but mostly from the new 
generations of workers.   As economies grow, productivity and income in the informal sector stagnate.  
Labor force growth slows down the absorption of labor in the formal sector, but eventually this process 
does take place.  The supply of human capital, in contrast, speeds up the creation of formal firms.  Some 
survey evidence on Peruvian slums collected and provided to us by Nathan Nadramija shows that it is 
mostly the children of the informal sector workers, rather than these workers themselves, who become 
educated and join the modern economy.   As they do, the share of informal economy declines because 
the unproductive informal firms cannot survive in the modern economy.    
 
Conclusion 
  The evidence we have presented is broadly consistent with the dual view of informality: 
informal firms stay permanently informal, they hire informal workers for cash, buy their inputs for cash, 
and sell their products for cash, they are extremely unproductive, and they are unlikely to benefit much 
from becoming formal.  This approach generates the strong prediction that the cure for informality is 
economic growth.  The evidence strongly supports this prediction: informality declines, although slowly, 
with development.    
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 This approach suggests that structural policies designed to promote formality should be 
introduced with caution.  Their wisdom depends, in part on whether they encourage formalization, or 
discourage informal activity.  Thus simplification of registration advocated by De Soto (1989) is probably 
a good idea, even though the evidence suggests that it is unlikely to have large benefits.  On the other 
hand, we are skeptical of all policies that might tax or regulate informal firms.  Rather than encourage 
informal firms to become formal, such policies may have the effect of driving them out of business, 
leading to poverty and destitution of informal workers and entrepreneurs.   The recognition of the 
fundamental fact that informal firms are extremely inefficient  recommends extreme caution with 
policies that impose on them any kind of additional costs.    
There is accumulating  evidence  that  growth  that kills the informal sector is driven by the 
formation and expansion of formal firms managed by educated entrepreneurs.  Uneducated 
entrepreneurs – in both informal and formal sectors – generally run small and inefficient firms; educated 
entrepreneurs and managers run larger and more efficient firms.  This is the dark side of dualism: 
informal economies are so large in poor countries because their entrepreneurs are so unproductive.    
The evidence suggests that an important bottleneck to economic growth is not the supply of 
better educated workers; indeed, at least on many observable characteristics the workers are rather 
similar in informal and formal firms.  Rather, the bottleneck is the supply of educated entrepreneurs – 
people who can run productive businesses.   These entrepreneurs create and expand modern businesses 
with which informal firms, despite all their benefits of avoiding taxes and regulations, simply cannot 
compete.  This is how the informal economy dies out in the process of development.    From this 
perspective, the policy message for how to grow the formal economy and shrink the informal one is to 
increase  —whether through immigration or education  and training—  the supply of educated 
entrepreneurs.   
17 
 References 
Ardagna, Silvia, and Annamaria Lusardi. 2008.  “Explaining International Differences in Entrepreneurship: 
The Role of Individual Characteristics and Regulatory Constraints.” In International Differences in 
Entrepreneurship, ed. Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2011.  Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight 
Global Poverty.  New York, Perseus Books, Public Affairs.   
 
de Andrade, Gustavo Henrique, Miriam Bruhn, and David McKenzie. 2013. “A helping hand or the long 
arm of the law? Experimental evidence on what governments can do to formalize firms.”  World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6435. 
 
de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie, Christopher Woodruff. 2008. “Who are the microenterprise owners? 
Evidence from Sri Lanka on Tokman v. de Soto.” The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
Series: 4635.  
 
de Mel, Suresh, David McKenzie, and Christopher Woodruff. 2013. “The Demand for, and Consequences 
of Formalization among Informal Firms in Sri Lanka.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 
5(2): 122-150.  
 
De Soto, Hernando. 1989. The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. New York: Harper 
and Row. 
 
De Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else. New York: Basic Books. 
  
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2002. “The Regulation 
of Entry.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 1: 1–37. 
 
Farrell, Diana. 2004. “The Hidden Dangers of the Informal Economy.” McKinsey Quarterly 3: 27-37. 
 
Gennaioli, Nicola, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2013. “Human Capital 
and Regional Development.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128:1: 105-164. 
 
Harris, J. and Michael Todaro. 1970. “Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A Two Sector 
Analysis.” American Economic Review 40: 126-142.  
 
Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Benjamin Olken. 2014.  “The Missing “Missing Middle.”” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, this issue.  
 
Hurst, Erik, and Benjamin  Pugsley.  2011.  “What Do Small Businesses Do?” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity Fall: 73-118. 
 
Jaramillo, Miguel. 2009. “Is There Demand for Formality among Informal Firms? Evidence from 
Microfirms in Downtown Lima.” German Development Institute Discussion Paper 12/2009. 
 
Johnson, Simon, Kaufmann, Daniel and Shleifer, Andrei. 1997. "The Unofficial Economy in Transition," 
18 
 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 1997, Washington, D.C. 
 
Karlan, Dean, and Jonathan Zinman. 2011. “Microcredit in Theory and Practice: Using Randomized  
  Credit Scoring for Impact Evaluation.” Science 332 (6035): 1278-1284. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, and Andrei Shleifer.  2008.  “The Unofficial Economy and Economic Development.”  
  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Fall: 275-352. 
 
Levy,  Santiago. 2008. Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality, and Economic Growth  
  In Mexico. Brookings Institution.  
 
Lewis, W. Arthur.  1954. “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor.” Manchester School 
22:139-191. 
 
Marx, Benjamin, Thomas Stoker, and Tavneet Suri.  2013. “The Economics of Slums in the Developing 
World.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(4): 187-210.  
 
Murphy, Kevin, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny.  1989a. “Industrialization and the Big Push.” Journal 
of Political Economy 97(5): 1003-1026. 
 
Murphy, Kevin, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny.  1989b. “Income Distribution, Market Size, and 
Industrialization.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (3): 537-564. 
 
Rauch, James. 1991. “Modeling the Informal Sector Formally.” Journal of Development Economics 
35(1): 33-47.  
   
19 
  
Figure 1.  Ratio of the average value added by informal firms to value added by formal firms. 
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Figure 2.  Ratio of the average value added by informal firms to value added by small formal firms. 
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Figure 3.  Average percent of firms run by a college-educated top manager in the informal and formal 
sectors.  
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Figure 4.  Self-employment and GDP per capita. 
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Figure 5.  Partial correlation graph of change in self-employment, growth in GDP per capita, and growth 
in the labor force.  The regression includes country fixed effects, i.e. we regress: 
𝗥(self employment) = α + β.ln  (𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑐𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑐𝑡−1)+ γ.ln  (𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑡/𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑡−1)+δi+ε 
where δi are country fixed effects. 
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Figure 6.  Income of employees, self-employed, and GDP per capita in Peru. 
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